[mdlug] A big opportunity for Linux?
Aaron Kulkis
akulkis3 at hotpop.com
Tue Nov 20 16:08:28 EST 2007
Adam Tauno Williams wrote:
>>> And all the noise about how bad Vista is misses the point - the fact is
>>> that XP is in most cases good enough, hence the lack of a business case
>>> for the pain/expense of Vista.
>> Yes, that's what I said - Vista doesn't offer anything new that people
>> want, and it's a substantial cost to upgrade.
>> However... XP will not *stay* 'good enough'. MS can't (politically) afford
>> to put much support effort into XP. XP will stagnate, while alternatives
>> move forward.
>
> Of course, nothing stays good enough; but I know lots of places and
> organizations still using 2000. These technologies remain viable for
> much longer than we techies remain infatuated with them.
>
>>> While techy types get worked up about, often obscure, security issues
>>> most businesses, especially small business (all small businesses?) just
>>> do-not-care.
>> ...until they get hit with a security problem.
>
> Of course.
>
>>> <aside>Not to mention that enforcing a decent security policy among
>>> LINUX desktops is a major PITA and almost completely
>>> undocumented.
>> Well, enforcing a *Windows-ish* security policy, perhaps.
>
> No, there is nothing Window-ish about notifying users of password change
> requirements, etc...
>
>>> GDM is going to tell you that the DSA is going to expire your
>>> account in 14 days if you don't change your password.... nope.
>> I'd thought GDM 2.x had been revamped to deal with things like that...
>
> Some yes, it a-l-m-o-s-t works. Unfortunately there really aren't any
> standard/open ways for GDM to know, unless you are still using an
> obsolete technique like shadow passwords via NIS.
>
>>> You can view/edit file ACLs from nautilus... nope.
>> What, specifically, do you need ACLs for that can't be accomplished with
>> more traditional u/g/o permissions?
>
> A user wants two other user's to be able to edit their file, and the
> secretary to be able to read the file? The u/g/o permissions from
> UNIX are basically useless to users.
In actual practice in the workplace, I've never seen
u/g/o rwx to be insufficient for that sort of task.
I suppose the CIA would be an exception...but that's a VERY
special exception.
Even in the combat environment of Baghdad, ACLs are an
extremely heavy-handed way of solving the problem (and
in many ways, even clumsier than u/g/o rwx).
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